Publications
10-2004

Final Report: Review of the FITS Program: Program Tasks, Goals
and Pilot Training Initiatives
Alex Chaparro
Wichita State University, chapara3@erau.edu

Bonnie Lida Rogers
Christopher J. Hamblin

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/publication
Part of the Aviation and Space Education Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Chaparro, A., Rogers, B. L., & Hamblin, C. J. (2004). Final Report: Review of the FITS Program: Program
Tasks, Goals and Pilot Training Initiatives. , (). Retrieved from https://commons.erau.edu/publication/
1169

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
commons@erau.edu.

DOT/FAA/AR-xx/xx
Office of Aviation Research
Washington, D.C. 20591

Final Report: Review of the FITS
Program: Program tasks, goals
and pilot training initiatives

October 2004
Final Report

This document is available to the U.S. public
through the National Technical Information
Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161.

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

NOTICE
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the
U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest of information
exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability
for the contents or use thereof. The United States Government
does not endorse products or manufacturers.
Trade or
manufacturer's names appear herein solely because they are
considered essential to the objective of this report.

Technical Report Documentation Page
1. Report No.

2. Government Accession No.

3. Recipient's Catalog No.

DOT/FAA/AR-xx/xx
4. Title and Subtitle

5. Report Date

Final Report: Review of the FITS Program: Program tasks, goals and pilot training
initiatives
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Author(s)

8. Performing Organization Report No.

Alex Chaparro, Bonnie Lida Rogers, Christopher J. Hamblin
9. Performing Organization Name and Address

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

National Institute for Aviation Research

Wichita State University
1845 Fairmount
Wichita, KS 67260

11. Contract or Grant No.

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Office of Aviation Research
Washington, DC 20591

Final Report

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

AFS-300
15. Supplementary Notes

The FAA Technical Center Monitor was William Krebs
16. Abstract

In 2002 the FAA, academic and industry partners established the FAA/Industry Training Standards (FITS) program whose
purpose is to modernize General Aviation (GA) pilot training. The FAA recognized the need to modernize training standards for
pilots who would use new avionics technology that integrate the GPS (Global Positioning Systems) with the autopilot along with
multifunction displays capable of depicting flight path, weather, terrain and traffic information. These avionics and displays are
touted as improving safety by enhancing pilot Situational Awareness and reducing pilot workload. The new technology has
highlighted the need for programs to train and certify pilots to use the avionics suites. The instrumentation places new demands
on pilots including changes in the level and distribution of pilot workload during a flight, the need to manage and integrate
information from multiple displays, navigate complex menu structures, and program navigation computers. The literature
describing the FITS program argues that the current structure and content of GA pilot training programs will not adequately
prepare pilots for the challenges of using these technologies (FAA, 2003a; Glista, 2003b; Wright, 2002). The FITS curriculum
attempts to address these issues by stressing training of risk management (RM), situational awareness (SA), aeronautical decision
making (ADM) and single-pilot resource management (SRM). It also proposes to change pilot instruction to make it more
relevant to real world flying by relying on scenario-based training (SBT). FITS proposes to emphasize the use of scenarios as a
means to practice the integration of individual skills as they might occur in the real world. For instance, a student pilot might be
instructed to plan a flight from Wichita, KS to Kansas City, MO. The student would perform all the tasks necessary to plan the
flight including preflight checks, route planning, checking the weather reroute etc. During the flight the student would
demonstrate individual flight skills including turns, climbs, navigation, and communication while executing the scenario. The
purpose of this project was to review research related to the proposed initiatives and to identify future research needs to support
the long-term objectives of FITS. In addition to reviewing pertinent academic and government literature, the objectives of FITS
were reviewed with representatives of the FAA, academic and industry partners. At present FITS materials provide few details
regarding important components of the training initiative including decision making, the training requirements of advanced
avionics technology and its effects on situation awareness. Future work should draw on an extensive academic literature and on
lessons learned from prior industry experience when similar avionics technologies were introduced to commercial aviation. Also,
clear distinctions should be made between SBT as employed in FITS and SBT used by the military and in commercial aviation.
These are very different programs.
17. Key Words

18. Distribution Statement

FITS, pilot training, decision making, scenario based training

This document is available to the public through the National
Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia
22161.

19. Security Classif. (of this report)

20. Security Classif. (of this page)

Unclassified
Form DOT F1700.7

Unclassified
(8-72)

21. No. of Pages

16

Reproduction of completed page authorized

22. Price

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We would like to acknowledge the contribution and commitment of the following
individuals and their organizations to this effort: Chad Martin and Kirby Ortega (Cessna
Aircraft Company), Frank Ayers and Tom Connolly (Embry-Riddle University), Robert
Wright, Tom Glista, and Ken Knopp (Federal Aviation Administration), Paul Craig
(Middle Tennessee State University), Mike Radomsky (Cirrus Pilots’ Proficiency
Program), Meghan Dierks, M.D. (Harvard University/MIT, Center for Medical
Simulation), Frank Greitzer (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory), Steve Casner
(NASA Ames Research Center), David Dewhirst (Sabris Corporation), Jeremy Slocum,
Satoru Tokuda, and Shivashankar Naidu (WSU). We would also like to thank our FAA
technical monitor William Krebs for his support and assistance in completing the project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ v
ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
2. ADVANCED AVIONICS .............................................................................................. 3
2.1 Past Introductions of Advanced Avionics .............................................................. 4
2.2 Pilot Understanding of Automation........................................................................ 4
2.3 Pilot Trust and Automation Induced Complacency................................................ 5
2.4 Effects on Situational Awareness (SA) .................................................................. 6
2.5 Effects on Pilot Risk Taking................................................................................... 6
2.6 Design of the Automation Interface ....................................................................... 7
2.7 Effects of Automation on Pilot Skills..................................................................... 8
2.8 Research Questions concerning Pilot Instruction and the Use of Advanced
Avionics.................................................................................................................. 8
3. SCENARIO- VERSUS PART-TASK TRAINING........................................................ 8
3.1 SBT in Training Programs...................................................................................... 9
3.1.1 SBT in the Military …………………………………………………………9
3.1.2 SBT in Commercial Aviation ...…….………………………………………9
3.1.3 Comparison of LOFT SBT and FITS SBT ………………………………..11
3.2 Research Questions Concerning Pilot Instruction and the Use of SBT................ 13
4. DECISION MAKING .................................................................................................. 14
4.1 Training in Judgment............................................................................................ 14
4.2 Expert Performance .............................................................................................. 15
4.3 Critical Thinking Skills Training.......................................................................... 16
4.4 Research Questions Concerning Pilot Instruction and Training on Decision
Making.................................................................................................................. 17
5. STANDARD VERSUS COMBINED PRIVATE AND INSTRUMENT RATING.... 18
6. USE OF PERSONAL COMPUTER-BASED AVIATION TRAINING DEVICES ... 19
7. CURRENT STATUS OF THE FITS PROGRAM....................................................... 20

iii

8. REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 23
9. APPENDIX A............................................................................................................... 31

iv

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1

Cockpit of a Cessna 182 equipped with the Garmin G1000.
Courtesy of Cessna Aircraft Company ………………………………………..…….13

2

Cockpit of a Diamond DA40 equipped with an Avidyne Enterga suite.
Courtesy of Avidyne Corporation ……………………………………...….………..16

v

ABBREVIATIONS
ACM
ADF
ADM
AGATE
CAAA
CRM
DME
DOT
DTRDB
EMS
FAA
FAR
FITS
FMS
FTD
GA
GAMA
GAO
GPS
GWIS
IFR
IMC
LOFT
LTM
MFD
NASA
NEXRAD
NTSB
OEM
PCATD
PTS
PTT
RM
SA
SATS
SBT
SRM
STM
TAA
TAWS
TCAS
VMC
VOR
WHCASS

Air Combat Maneuvering
Automatic Direction Finder
Aeronautical Decision Making
Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments
Civil Aviation Authority Australia
Crew Resource Management
Distance Measuring Experiments
Department of Transportation
Department of Transport and Regional Development Bureau
Emergency Medical Services
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Aviation Regulation
Federal Aviation Administration/Industry Training Standard
Flight Management System
Flight Training Device
General Aviation
General Aviation Manufacturers Association
General Accounting Office
Global Positioning System
Graphical Weather Information System
Instrument Flight Rules
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
Line Oriented Flight Training
Long-Term Memory
Multifunction Display
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Next Generation Weather Radar
National Transportation Safety Board
Original Equipment Manufacturer
Personal Computer based Aviation Training Device
Practical Test Standard
Part-Task Training
Risk Management
Situational Awareness
Small Aircraft Transportation System
Scenario-Based Training
Single-pilot Resource Management
Short-Term Memory
Technically Advanced Aircraft
Terrain Awareness & Warning System
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
Visual Meteorological Conditions
Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
vi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 2002 the FAA, academic and industry partners established the FAA/Industry Training
Standards (FITS) program whose purpose is to modernize General Aviation (GA) pilot
training. The FAA recognized the need to modernize training standards for pilots who
would use new avionics technology that integrate the GPS (Global Positioning Systems)
with the autopilot along with multifunction displays capable of depicting flight path,
weather, terrain and traffic information. These avionics and displays are touted as
improving safety by enhancing pilot Situational Awareness and reducing pilot workload.
The new technology has highlighted the need for programs to train and certify pilots to
use the avionics suites. Glass cockpits place new demands on pilots including changes in
the level and distribution of pilot workload during a flight, the need to manage and
integrate information from multiple displays, navigate complex menu structures, and
program navigation computers. The literature describing the FITS program argues that
the current structure and content of GA pilot training programs will not adequately
prepare pilots for the challenges of using these technologies (FAA, 2003a; Glista, 2003b;
Wright, 2002). The FITS curriculum attempts to address these issues by stressing training
of risk management (RM), situational awareness (SA), aeronautical decision making
(ADM) and single-pilot resource management (SRM). It also proposes to change pilot
instruction to make it more relevant to real world flying by relying on scenario-based
training (SBT). FITS proposes to emphasize the use of scenarios as a means to practice
the integration of individual skills as they might occur in the real world. For instance, a
student pilot might be instructed to plan a flight from Wichita, KS to Kansas City, MO.
The student would perform all the tasks necessary to plan the flight including preflight
checks, route planning, checking the weather reroute etc. During the flight the student
would demonstrate individual flight skills including turns, climbs, navigation, and
communication while executing the scenario. The purpose of this project was to review
research related to the proposed initiatives and to identify future research needs to
support the long-term objectives of FITS. In addition to reviewing pertinent academic
and government literature, the objectives of FITS were reviewed with representatives of
the FAA, academic and industry partners. At present FITS materials provide few details
regarding important components of the training initiative including decision making, the
training requirements for advanced avionics technology and its effects on situation
awareness. Future work should draw on an extensive academic literature and on lessons
learned from prior industry experience when similar avionics technologies were
introduced to commercial aviation. Also, clear distinctions should be made between SBT
as employed in FITS and SBT used by the military and in commercial aviation. These
are very different programs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2002 the FAA, academic and industry partners established the FAA/Industry Training
Standards (FITS) program whose purpose is to modernize General Aviation (GA) pilot
training. The program was motivated by several factors including GA accident rates, the
introduction of advanced avionics technology and an anticipated diversification of the
aviation market place. In 1998 the FAA strategic plan (FAA, 1998) set the goal of
reducing GA accidents 20% by the year 2007. This goal was established between the
FAA and the DOT after an earlier White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security Report (WHCASS, 1997) called on the FAA to reduce fatal commercial aviation
rates by 80%. The FAA also recognized the need to modernize training standards for
pilots who would use new avionics technology including those that integrate the GPS
(Global Positioning Systems) with the autopilot along with multifunction displays
capable of depicting flight path, weather, terrain and traffic information (see Figure 1 and
2). The third cited motivation for the FITS program was an anticipated shift in
demographics in that a significant percentage of the population would choose to live
removed from major cities (Wright, 2002). It is predicted that this population will come
to rely upon on-demand air taxi services for transportation to and from major urban
centers thereby averting the travel complications associated with the established aircarrier hub and spoke systems (Norton, 2004). It has also been argued that the
availability of new higher performance personal aircraft with advanced avionics would
allow more individuals to fly themselves safely to their destinations. (However, see the
report on SATS (2002; TRB, 2002) for another view of these projected developments.)

Figure 1: Cockpit of a Cessna 182 equipped with the Garmin G1000. Courtesy of Cessna
Aircraft Company.
Whether the market for on-demand point-to-point air taxis exists is debatable; however, it
is clear that the demand for advanced avionics is large and growing. These and other
proposed avionics and displays including the “Highway in the Sky” and the “cockpit
associate” concept are touted as improving safety by enhancing pilot Situational
Awareness (SA) and reducing pilot workload. Independent of its potential benefits the
introduction of new technology has highlighted the need for programs to train and certify
pilots to use the avionics suites. General aviation OEM’s now offer advanced avionics as
standard equipment on many aircraft models (e.g., Beechcraft Bonanza’s A36, Cessna
1

182, Cirrus SR22, Diamond DA-40). The capabilities and functionality afforded a GA
pilot by the new avionics approaches that of a commercial aircraft operated by two crew
members. In the case of commercial, charter and corporate pilots, they must undergo
recurrent proficiency instrument training in the aircraft they fly at regular intervals
(Glista, 2003a). No such requirement exists for GA pilots.
The instrumentation places new demands on pilots including changes in the level and
distribution of pilot workload during a flight, the need to manage and integrate
information from multiple displays, navigate complex menu structures, and program
navigation computers. Unlike older steam-gauge knob and dial systems, the avionics
supplied by manufacturers such as Chelton, Honeywell, Garmin, and Avidyne do not
function nor necessarily look alike increasing the possibility for negative transfer of
learning when transitioning between different avionics packages. The literature
describing the FITS program argues that the current structure and content of GA pilot
training programs will not adequately prepare pilots for the challenges of using these
technologies (FAA, 2003a; Glista, 2003b; Wright, 2002).
The changes in pilot instruction proposed by FITS represent changes in the content and
delivery of pilot instruction (SBT, integrated ab initio and instrument rating). The FITS
curriculum attempts to address these issues by stressing training of risk management
(RM), situational awareness (SA), aeronautical decision making (ADM) and single-pilot
resource management (SRM). It also proposes to change pilot instruction to make it more
relevant to real world flying by employing SBT. The SBT approach is summarized well
by the armed services’ mantra “Train the way you fight, fight the way you train.” FITS
has adapted this mantra for GA pilot training and refers to it as “train the way you will fly
and fly the way you train”. FITS proposes to emphasize the use of scenarios as a means
to practice the integration of individual skills as they might occur in the real world. For
instance, a student pilot might be instructed to plan a flight from Wichita, KS to Kansas
City, MO. The student would then perform all the tasks necessary to plan the flight
including preflight checks, route planning, checking the weather reroute, etc. During the
flight the student would then perform the individual flight skills including turns, climbs,
stall recovery, navigation, and communication while executing the scenario. The
instructors’ role is to allow the student pilot to perform the flight tasks with a minimum
of interference. This allows the students to practice the skills as they would in the real
world thus increasing the transfer of learning to real world flying. Finally, FITS will also
explore the potential of a combined ab initio and instrument rating as a means of reducing
the time and cost of pilot training.
The academic partners, including Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and the
University of North Dakota flight training program are responsible for developing pilot
training materials that adhere to the approach described above. A number of pilot
training
materials
are
currently
available
at
the
FITS
website
(http://www.faa.gov/avr/afs/fits/index.cfm) including generic private/instrument,
recurrent and transition training master syllabi. In addition to developing generic training
materials the academic institutions in conjunction with the FAA will review materials
submitted by aircraft and equipment manufacturers to ensure that they meet FITS criteria.
2

The pilot training programs developed by FITS will not result in new FAA regulations or
changes in policy. Rather the FAA will recognize FITS compliant training as an industry
technical standard. The advantage of this approach is that it allows a rapid response to
changes in the aviation industry and does not require the lengthy review necessary to
establish new regulations.
The purpose of this project was to review research related to the proposed initiatives and
to identify future research needs to support the long term objectives of FITS. In addition
to reviewing pertinent academic and government literature, the objectives of FITS were
reviewed with representatives of the FAA, academic and industry partners.
2. ADVANCED AVIONICS
One of the touted benefits of using advanced avionics in GA aircraft is a reduction in
accidents through improved Situational Awareness (SA) and reduced pilot workload that
increase the “available safety” (FAA, 2003b). New avionics will provide the pilot with
near real time weather information (NEXRAD images), traffic avoidance (TCAS),
Terrain Awareness & Warning Systems (TAWS) and GPS-driven moving map displays
for navigation. Although more information is often desirable from the pilot’s perspective
it does not necessarily result in improved decision making (Slovic, 1981) or safety. This
is illustrated by a recent analysis of accidents involving Technically Advanced Aircraft
(TAA) (FAA, 2003b). The FAA defines TAAs as aircraft having a “minimum of an IFRcertified GPS navigation system with a moving map display, and an integrated autopilot”
(FAA, 2003b). The analysis was motivated by accident rates for TAAs that were “not
substantially lower than the accident rates of comparable newly produced non-TAAs, as
had been expected” (FAA, 2003b). The findings of the report state that the problems
identified were typical of previous introductions of advanced avionics technology and
also reflect common pilot judgment errors.
Although, new technology can reduce or eliminate some classes of errors it can in turn
introduce new failure error modes or systems failures (Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997;
Wiener, 1988) which require new pilot skills and knowledge. It also redistributes pilot
workload from the execution of manual or perceptual-motor acts of flying an airplane to
higher level cognitive demands associated with supervisory control that involve
monitoring and integrating information from multiple sources. The human factors
literature is replete with examples of incidents from the aviation, maritime, industrial, and
medical fields illustrating the vulnerabilities of automated systems (Casey, 1993).
Nevertheless, these industries have benefited from increased automation and they have
accumulated a wealth of experience that could benefit FITS.
We conclude from our review that existing FITS initiatives may not adequately prepare a
pilot to reap the benefits of the advanced technology. The following sections identify a
number of issues that the proposed GA pilot training programs should address by
documenting the impact of automation on user behavior and highlighting human factors
issues related to the design of the interface.

3

Figure 2: Cockpit of a Diamond DA40 equipped with an Avidyne Enterga suite. Courtesy
of Avidyne Corporation.
2.1 Past Introductions of Advanced Avionics
Glass cockpits similar to those being introduced in GA first became available in
commercial aviation with the introduction of the Boeing 757/767 and Airbus A310/320.
The transition to glass cockpits can be challenging as pilots have reported that the switch
to a highly automated aircraft is more difficult than the transition between aircraft with
conventional avionics (Sarter & Woods, 1997; Sarter et al., 1997). After a number of
incidents and accidents, the FAA in 1996 commissioned a study of the interface between
the flight crew and automated systems on highly automated aircraft. Although the level
of automation in commercial aviation and GA differ in terms of degree and
sophistication, many of the problems associated with automation identified in FAA
technical reports and in later academic and government technical literature are pertinent
to GA (Dekker & Hollnagel, 1999; DTRDB, 1998; Sarter et al., 1997). These problems
include poor pilot understanding of the function and design of automation, automation
induced complacency, user reports of increased risk taking, degradation of basic
instrument or other manual flight skills, poor design of the instrument interface, and an
unfavorable effect on SA.
2.2 Pilot Understanding of Automation
An FAA report (1996) and a survey of commercial pilots conducted by the Australian
Department of Transport and Regional Development conclude that pilots do not have an
adequate understanding of aircraft automation. This conclusion is supported by
numerous examples of pilots being surprised by the unexpected behavior of the aircraft
automation. (Sarter et al., 1997) have argued that automation surprises reflect an
incomplete or incorrect mental model of the system’s design and function. Through
interaction with a system a user develops a mental model representing their
understanding of the system’s operation, its components and interaction among those
components. The mental model enables the user to predict the operation of the system in
response to a given input (Norman, 1983). The fidelity of the mental model may be
critical as it determines the degree to which the pilot can rely on the model to accurately
predict the systems response to different inputs during emergencies.
4

Pilots’ inaccurate or deficient mental models of automated systems may arise from
training programs that emphasize operating the system and not how various system
functions are implemented and interact (Sarter et al., 1997). Training that relies on the
rote memorization of system descriptions and function does not facilitate the
development of an accurate mental model whereas conceptual knowledge or “how-itworks” training may. This form of training has been shown to facilitate the learning of
procedures and results in greater retention than rote memorization (Kieras & Bovair,
1984). To date we are not aware of any study that identifies the unique skills and
knowledge required for a GA pilot to use automation effectively. Such information
would be particularly relevant to decisions regarding the content and emphasis of training
on automated system’s that is to be included in FITS training syllabi.
Sarter, Woods and Billings (1997) have stressed training that supports a users’ active
exploration of various systems options and interactions among systems instead of
teaching a standard mental model. Activities such as “free play” simulator sessions
(DTRDB, 1998; Sherman, 1997) can promote the development of a more detailed mental
model of the contingencies and interactions among automated systems which is essential
if a pilot is to effectively trouble shoot system malfunctions in flight. This view receives
some support from the survey data collected by (DTRDB, 1998). Pilots were asked how
training could be improved during transition training to highly automated aircraft. Fiftyeight percent of pilots who addressed automation said they would prefer more simulator
training with the flight management computer (FMC) trainer. The requests appear to
reflect a need for more time to further explore system functions and thereby consolidate
their understanding of the system. Pilot requests for more training time on simulators of
advanced avionics have been also been reported by Cessna Aircraft for their new aircraft
equipped with the Garmin G1000 (K. Ortega, personnel communication, August 24,
2004).
2.3 Pilot Trust and Automation Induced Complacency
Pilot confidence or trust in advanced avionics tends to be high (St. George & Nendick,
1997) which increases the potential for complacency and the inappropriate use of the
technology. Survey data show that many private pilots report occasionally or never
cross-checking GPS data against other sources (ADF, VOR, DME) and relying almost
exclusively on GPS instead of maps (St. George & Nendick, 1997). Data from
commercial aviation show similar trends (DTRDB, 1998). The DTRDB survey of
commercial aviation pilots found that 16% reported they were less likely to refer to
instrument charts on aircraft with advanced technology and 13% believed all the
information they needed for the safe conduct of a flight was in the flight management
system (FMS). The failure to cross check data from automated systems increases the
likelihood of pilots failing to detect input errors or system malfunctions. Input errors can
occur during the programming of aircraft systems. Likewise, the accuracy of GPS
position information changes as the availability of satellites varies or the signal is masked
or shielded by terrain or aircraft parts. Complacency or a false sense of security does not
necessarily represent an absence of motivation or professionalism but may be engendered
5

by user interactions with highly reliable automated systems where failures rarely occur.
Imploring human operators to monitor and be vigilant for rare events is ineffective given
the humans poor performance in sustained attention tasks.
2.4 Effects on Situational Awareness (SA)
The data cited above illustrate some of the ways in which enhanced avionics and
automation can affect SA. Advanced avionics can also reduce SA because the pilot is
less involved in the manual control of the aircraft. Previously, the pilot had to
continuously monitor and process information about position and various systems
functions as a basis for future manual control inputs. With automated systems these
demands are greatly reduced. Consequently, the pilot is not required to monitor the
systems as frequently, or process the information to sufficient depth to detect data input
errors or system problems. A pilot of an automated aircraft may have less SA, just as a
car passenger is likely to have poorer SA than a driver. Automation may give rise to pilot
feelings of being “along for the ride” (Wiener, 1988). Rather than a Pilot in Command
one might refer to this situation as a Passenger in Command (S. Casner, personal
communication, August 27, 2004).
In the advent of a failure, the pilot will be missing states of knowledge including possibly
the position of the aircraft relative to terrain or obstacles. In the DTRDB survey
(DTRDB, 1998), 14% of respondents reported instances of finding their aircraft
unexpectedly close to terrain. This view receives some support from a recent study
(Casner, 2004a). Two groups of pilots were instructed to fly a course with a number of
waypoints. One group of pilots flew the course using standard navigation instrumentation
and maps as reference and the other group was allowed to program the flight using GPS
navigation instruments. Upon completing the flight pilots were then asked to repeat the
flight without the use of maps or the GPS as a reference. The pilots’ accuracy was
measured in terms of their distance from each waypoint. The pilots who initially flew the
course using a map and standard navigation instruments performed significantly better
than pilots who used GPS.
This result is not entirely surprising for several reasons. First, the data cited earlier show
that pilots using GPS and moving maps displays are not as cognitively involved in the
navigation of the aircraft, cross checking the scene outside the window with sectional
charts, and other navigation aids. Second, because terrain information and information
regarding the aircraft’s course are available on aircraft displays the pilot does not need to
commit it to memory. However, should the display fail these two factors would work to
undermine awareness of spatial position.
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2.5 Effects on Pilot Risk Taking
The availability of more detailed weather information can increase the likelihood of pilots
electing to fly in marginal conditions or use the information for other than its intended
purpose. For instance, Latorella and Chamberlain (2002; Latorella & Chamberlain,
2002) reported pilots’ tendency to use a Graphical Weather Information System (GWIS)
tactically to avoid hazardous weather conditions even though the temporal or spatial
resolution of the weather information was insufficient for this purpose. A survey of
pilots participating in the Capstone project (FAA, 2002a) indicated increased risk taking.
Under Capstone, 200 Alaskan aircraft were equipped with a multifunction display
(MFD), GPS and datalink. A survey revealed that 84% of the pilots reported “there would
be or already is” an increased tendency to fly under lower visibility conditions using the
displays. Roughly half of the pilots agreed that there was an increased tendency to engage
in other risky behaviors including flying at lower altitudes under low visibility
conditions, flying closer to hazardous terrain features, etc. Nendick and St. George (1995;
1997) reported an increased likelihood of flying in bad or marginal conditions in pilots
using GPS. This could further increase accidents involving pilots authorized to operate in
visual meteorological conditions (VMC) flying into instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC) (O'Hare & Wiegmann, 2003) and supports the need for training on decision
making and risk management in the FITS curriculum.
2.6 Design of the Automation Interface
Another factor that can contribute to pilot error in automated aircraft is the design of the
equipment interface. Both the FAA and Australian reports cited complex, cluttered,
difficult to read displays, difficult to detect warnings, prompts or mode change (DTRDB,
1998; FAA, 2003c), the absence of standardization in the look of displays within and
between manufacturers, as well as the functionality (similar controls that do different
things) and system messages that are difficult to understand. These issues increase the
difficulty of using the avionics, learning to use new or different suites, and increase the
likelihood of negative transfer of learning where the correct response is directed at the
wrong, but similar, target (control, button, or menu option). In addition, programming
navigation instrumentation requires considerable attention increasing pilot head-down
time at inopportune moments (FAA, 2002a, 2003c) thus decreasing a pilot’s SA. This
issue was cited as the predominant safety problem associated with TAAs. An effort
spearheaded by the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) Cockpit
Standardization Group is addressing some of these issues. With industry and FAA
participation, the group is developing standards for display design symbology, and the
pilot interface (GAMA, 2004).
The training requirements of advanced navigation instrumentation like GPS are likely to
be greater than for conventional navigation instruments. Modern avionics require
mastery of software interfaces, procedures for programming avionics and navigation of
menu hierarchies. (FAA, 2003c) investigated the usability of advanced GA cockpit
navigation displays during simulated instrument flight conditions. They reported that
after 2 to 3 hours of training, pilots still made errors and required assistance from
7

experimenters to perform certain functions. A recent study found that pilots did not show
proficiency in many IFR GPS skills even after ground study and five practice flights
(Casner, 2004b). These data provide justification for the approach adopted by Australia
wherein pilots are required to attend training and be flight tested before receiving an
endorsement to use a GPS display for IFR conditions (CAAA, 2000).
2.7 Effects of Automation on Pilot Skills
Advanced avionics may have deleterious effects on flying skills as pilots spend
increasing amounts of time in a supervisory/monitoring role rather than flying the
aircraft. Interestingly, a significant number of pilots in an Australian survey (51%)
agreed that they “preferred to hand fly part of every trip so as to maintain their skills, and
43% of believed that their flying skills had declined since they had started flying
advanced technology aircraft (DTRDB, 1998). This finding is not unique having been
reported previously by a number of researchers (Sherman, 1997; Wiener, 1988). Similar
concerns have been expressed by GA pilots (Sclair, 2004) regarding the impact
automation on basic instrument flight skills.
2.8 Research Questions concerning Pilot Instruction and the Use of Advanced Avionics
Due to the limited time available and cost of training, difficult decisions are required
concerning what and how much time to spend on various aspects of automation during
GA pilot training. For instance, what specific functions and features of the automation
should training emphasize (FAA, 2002a)? Will instruction include training in the
management of the information as a function of the phase of flight, including when to
turn off automation and take control of the aircraft (Wiener, 1988)? In a related matter,
will the nomenclature and organization of menus (menu hierarchy, options, etc.) be
standardized across manufacturers or will each system require a pilot to receive a
different endorsement? In the past, aircraft instrumentation looked and functioned
similarly even if designed by different manufacturers. This is not the case when one
compares the avionics provided by manufacturers such as Avidyne and Garmin. The
design and organization of the interface, including menu structures, labels, etc., differ
considerably. It is also possible that the failure modes and paths will differ, given that
they reflect different automation philosophies and design. This is of concern in the case
of a pilot who rents aircraft with different avionics suites. Research on mental models
indicates that users do not necessarily create and maintain device-specific mental models
(Norman, 1983). Also, the boundaries between mental models and their details can
become fuzzy when they have not been used regularly. Recurrency and regular
proficiency checks may be an important part of training to use advanced avionics.
3. SCENARIO- VERSUS PART-TASK TRAINING
There are several ideas that appear central to a scenario-based training (SBT) approach:
1) improving the transfer of training to real world flying by practice that emulates the
execution of tasks in the real world, and 2) de-emphasis of traditional part-task training
(PTT) involving the repeated practice of individual skills until proficiency, substituting
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practice of skills in context. This approach to training is strongly influenced by the
constructivist approach to education (Cobb, Wood, & Yackel, 1991).
The constructivist approach rejects traditional models of teaching where knowledge is
disseminated through lecture from a teacher to students who scrupulously write each
spoken word. Complex concepts are mastered by learning individual facts or ideas that
serve as the building blocks for later more advanced principles. Only later is the
knowledge applied to the real world. The constructivist approach attempts to capitalize
on students’ natural curiosity and enthusiasm by introducing the big concepts and
advanced ideas first, which create a context for concepts, and information that are the
basis for advanced principles. To maximize learning, examples drawn from the real
world are used in instruction. This allows the students to learn the concepts and see their
relationship to larger encompassing idea rather than in isolation and out of context
through rote memorization. Instead of lecturing, the instructor serves as a resource to
students as they explore the problem, identify important concepts, and acquire the basic
skills needed to address a specific problem. The purported benefit of this approach is
increased learning by acquiring the facts and skills through experiential learning in a
natural context. Applied to pilot instruction, the goal of scenario-based flight training is
to acquire and refine skills and knowledge in the context of executing a flight to a
particular destination. Thus, rather than flying to a practice area and executing
approaches, turns, climbs, etc. these maneuvers are practiced in the order in which they
naturally occur during a flight. This approach to training shares some philosophical
positions with Situated Learning (Lave, 1988) and in practice is similar to a number of
training methods including learning by doing (Gagne, 1962) and whole-task training
(Lintern & Wickens, 1991).
3.1 SBT Training Programs
3.1.1 SBT in the Military
While the origin and history of SBT is beyond the scope of this report, it can be argued
that the modern concept of SBT emerged from Naval Aviation. In response to relatively
low kill ratios of air-to-air engagements achieved in Southeast Asia, the Navy created a
graduate-level flight school to train Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) and weapons
systems employment. The Fighter Weapons Training School used actual aerial combat
scenarios that pitted students against instructors who used enemy tactics and aircraft
representative of the adversaries they would encounter during combat. By the end of the
Vietnam conflict, naval air combat kill ratios had returned to the level achieved during
World War II. The mantra “train like you fight, fight like you train,” has since spread
throughout the military to include almost every aspect of training for complex systems.
3.1.2 SBT in Commercial Aviation
SBT soon found its way into commercial aviation. In 1978, FAR 121 was amended to
allow airlines to use Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) as part of recurrent training.
LOFT is designed to simulate actual situations that pilots may encounter while “flying
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the line.” The scenarios are systematic and include any and all actions taken during a
flight including preflight checklists, weather briefings, and maintenance checks, as well
as advanced training such as crew resource management and decision-making skills.
The use of SBT has become ubiquitous in military training. It is also being used in
training of air traffic controllers, aircraft maintenance mechanics, law enforcement
officers, and emergency medical first responders (Lai, Entin, Dierks, Raemer, & Robert,
2004). Despite the ubiquity of SBT and the vast amount of research pertaining to its
implementation and use, we have not found empirical research demonstrating that SBT is
a more effective or efficient means of training. A study showing improved transfer of
training, reductions in cost- or improved safety would seem appropriate given the
changes and investments necessary to implement a successful SBT program.
One disadvantage of SBT is that high cognitive workloads can interfere with the initial
acquisition and the rate of development of individual skills (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987;
van Merrienboerg, Kirschner, & Kester, 2003). This fact is reflected in the well-known
phrase among flight instructors, “the cockpit is a terrible classroom”. The activity and
stress levels experienced during flight may offer few opportunities to reflect on one’s
decisions be they good or bad, thus potentially diminishing learning benefits. As outlined
by Schneider (1985), SBT makes a number of assumptions regarding the presumed
relationship between real-world training and training effectiveness that are suspect. It
assumes, for instance, that the frequency of events and their order in the real world is
optimal for learning, and that each scenario presents the opportunity to practice the
essential components of each task (Schneider, 1985). “Learning by doing” may be a
relatively inefficient way to acquire skills that have a significant procedural component:
examples include communication with air traffic control, instrument flight, etc. In such
instances, learning the list of actions to perform may contribute more to effective learning
of the task than practice of the final task (Gagne, 1962). In addition, students may spend
valuable time repeating skills that they have already mastered to get an opportunity to
repeat those components that require further practice (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 2000).
The benefits of SBT will depend on what skills or abilities one seeks to train. For
instance, PTT has the advantage of reducing the cognitive demands associated with
managing multiple tasks and typically results in faster skill development than is observed
in whole-task training (Brown & Carr, 1989; Schneider, 1985). However, performing in a
complex multi-task environment, like flying, requires the development of strategies for
controlling attention and for coordinating numerous subtasks. The pilot must decide what
to attend to and how much attention to allocate to each task. They must prioritize the
tasks and decide how often to monitor specific gauges or instruments. These skills are
more effectively trained as part of a whole-task than a PPT paradigm (Kramer & Larish,
1996; Schneider & Fisk, 1982). Recently, a hybrid training strategy called variedpriority training has shown promise as an alternative training paradigm (Fabiani et al.,
1989; Gopher, Weil, & Siegel, 1989). Varied-priority training embeds PTT within
whole-task training. Participants are asked to perform multiple tasks but the emphasis
placed on the different task components is varied across training sessions or blocks. The
advantage of this approach is that students learn how to coordinate and manage multiple
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tasks while reducing the processing loads that interfere with the acquisition of individual
task skills. To date, the published studies show that varied-priority training is effective in
training both component and task management skills (Gopher et al., 1989; Kramer,
Larish, & Strayer, 1995) and may be applicable to more complex aviation training
environments.
3.1.3 Comparison of LOFT SBT and FITS SBT
We have not identified any research that directly compared SBT to skill- or part-task
training curriculums. The primary advantage of SBT is that the training environment is
more realistic, more representative of the actual working environment; thus transfer of
training may be greater. Although the FITS definition of SBT is very similar to that of
LOFT training (see definitions below) and cites its use by commercial aviation and the
military, the training methods described in the FITS literature differ in a number of ways
from those used by the military and commercial aviation.
(per Guidelines for Line-Oriented Flight Training, NASA Conference Publication
2184, p. 6,Lauber & Foushee, 1981).
Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT): refers to the use of a training simulator
and a highly structured script or scenario to simulate the total line operational
environment for the purposes of training flight crews. Such training can include
initial training, transition training, upgrade training, recurrent training, and special
training, e.g., route or airport qualification training. The appropriate term should
appear as a prefix with LOFT, e.g., "Recurrent LOFT," to reflect the specific
application
(per FITS Master Instructor Syllabus: TAA Scenario Based Instructor Guide
V1.0, p. 3)
Scenario Based Training (SBT): SBT is training system that uses a highly
structured script of real-world experiences to address flight-training objectives in
an operational environment. Such training can include initial training, transition
training, upgrade training, recurrent training, and special training. The
appropriate term should appear with the term “Scenario Based,” e.g., “Scenario
Based Transition Training,” to reflect specific application
The main differences in definition include:
1. Use of simulator (LOFT) versus real world (FITS)


Simulation allows the behavior to unfold in such a way that the desired event
requiring student response, decision is reached. Scenario developers
emphasize the need to constrain the student’s behavior. Training in real world
situations does not allow this level of control.
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To assure that the decision point is reached with some degree of reliability;
scenarios should be performed in a simulated rather than real world
environment.
Development of scenarios is an iterative process which involves creation,
evaluation, revision, reevaluation, etc.

2. Properties of highly structured scripts:






All LOFT scenarios and flight segments should be designed on the basis of a
formal and detailed statement of specific objectives and desired end products.
Experience with LOFT indicates that scripts should be as detailed as possible
Communications should be scripted and utilized verbatim. The pacing and
timing of the scenario should be precisely specified so that the instructor
knows exactly when and how to introduce each element of the scenario.
Sub-scenarios should be designed in anticipation of crew actions. The only
way to know what actions may be taken is to test and evaluate scenarios to
identify the novel ways in which actors behave.
After development, scenarios should be carefully tested; revisions will almost
always be required.

3. Effective only in context of a total training program:




It is not a replacement for maneuver oriented flight training or “batting
practice.”
One of the absolute prerequisites of effective cockpit management is a highly
skilled, highly knowledgeable pilot.
LOFT is not a training program, but rather a tool to contribute to the overall
objectives of a program. (Lauber & Foushee, 1981)

Training programs, both military and civilian that have incorporated SBT into their
curriculum have undertaken systematic and thorough analyses of the knowledge, skills,
and procedures required by the domain. Information gathered from these analyses is used
to design the scenarios in a manner that insures that the appropriate skills necessary for
successful completion of the task are trained. Lai et al. (2004) used a battery of
knowledge elicitation techniques drawing from a variety of experts (i.e. domain experts,
psychologists, instructors, etc.) to identify fundamental activities and tasks required of the
trainees. Researchers developing scenarios for military training have employed a variety
of cognitive task analysis methodologies to identify critical training needs (CannonBowers, Burns, Salas, & Pruitt, 2000; Cohen, Thompson, Adelman, Bresnick, & Shastri,
2000; Oser, Cannon-Bowers, Dwyer, & Salas, 1997). Researchers have also used detailed
taxonomy of errors that are used to develop specific tasks within the scenarios (Greitzer,
Pond, & Jannotta, 2004; Lai et al., 2004). The taxonomy goes beyond the mere
classification of errors (such as that used in HFACS) to determine the cognitive basis of
the error. By understanding the root-cause of the error, specific interventions can be
designed into the scenario. Typically these various methods are used together as part of
an iterative process to design and validate the individual scenarios. Our review of the
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training syllabi published on the FITS website give no indication that such analyses were
used to select scenarios or identify content for training.
The military and commercial SBT use simulation because it allows a high level of control
to ensure that the trainee confronts specific situations designed to aide in the development
of certain skills. One of the problems of using time in the airplane to train complex skills
like decision making is that no two flights are the same. As pointed out by Schneider
(1985), in the real world, events are not designed to optimize learning. Consequently, the
situations one seeks to create may not materialize due to weather, traffic, ATC requests or
earlier decisions made by the student.
The canned scenarios published on the website are pre-scripted flight plans similar to a
typical dual cross-country flight. FITS’ curriculum may be more accurately described as
structured cross-country flight training (SCFT). A name change is in order to reduce
confusion and emphasize what is actually being done.
3.2 Research Questions Concerning Pilot Instruction
The literature describing FITS training provides few details regarding how to develop or
manage a scenario in a SCFT program, or whether such a training program should be
employed for all levels of pilot training. Given the literature reviewed above a number of
important issues need to be addressed including identification of training objectives that
would benefit most from SCFT, comparisons of SCFT and varied-priority training, and
details of how to implement SCFT. The following questions address these and related
issues.
1. How will scenarios to be selected?
2. What properties should individual scenarios contain?
3. What skills and competencies should a pilot have when training shifts to
scenarios?
4. Will SCFT be used for ab initio training or will it be used exclusively for
instrument flight training or transition training?
5. How will pilot performance be measured?
6. What type of feedback will the pilot receive and when will s/he receive it?
7. How will performance deficiencies be addressed: by repetition of the scenario or
by practice on the specific deficiency?
8. How frequently should individual skills be represented in a scenario to ensure
competency?
9. What new skills will SCFT require of the flight instructor community?
10. What guidance materials will be available to aid flight instructors in developing
and managing SCFT?
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4. DECISION MAKING
A comparison of accident rates across different sectors of aviation shows that GA has a
significantly higher accident rate than both commercial and corporate aviation (NTSB,
2004). The technologies being introduced to GA cockpits may reduce GA accident rates
through the touted benefits of improved SA. They may positively impact a number of
leading causes of GA accidents including controlled flight into terrain and weather
related decision making including ‘VFR into IMC’ (GAO, 2000). Although, ≈2% of GA
accidents are weather related, they account for 11% of GA fatalities that occurred
between 1990 and 1997 (Wiegman & Goh, 2000).
Access to information alone does not represent a sufficient basis for expectations of
enhanced safety. Central to the FITS strategy is a general emphasis on higher order
skills including risk management (RM), situational awareness (SA), aeronautical decision
making (ADM) and single-pilot resource management (SRM). This focus is justified
given the central role that these skills are believed to play in accidents. An early study by
Jensen and Benel (1977) found that 51.6% of fatal accidents (between 1970-1974) were
associated with decision errors. More recently, Weigmann and Shappell (1997) reported
that decision errors remain a major causal factor in 30% of GA accidents.
4.1 Training in Judgment
Although the accident statistics identify a weakness in pilot decision-making, it is unclear
why GA pilot training programs fail to teach this skill. The FAA requires pilot
instruction in aeronautical decision making but offers minimal guidance to flight
instructors of how this should be done. To date, most safety-related initiatives addressing
weather-related accidents have consisted of motivational and experiential based
approaches (Wiggins & O'Hare, 2003). However, training programs that identify
dangerous behaviors (i.e., scud running) and advise individuals of the dangers of such
behavior have little effect (Halpern, 1998, 2000). The absence of transferability of
knowledge to real world settings may result from: 1) content (i.e., emphasis on wrong
knowledge and/or skills) and 2) pedagogical style (i.e., part-task training versus SBT). If
pilot decision-making failures were related to one or both of these factors then the
primary focus of future research would be to identify the fundamental skills and
knowledge a pilot should master and the form that instruction should take. At present,
the literature does not identify which is the primary culprit in failures of GA decision
making.
The FITS training program assumes that both factors are implicated in accidents and
emphasizes SCFT, training in risk management, situational awareness, resource
management, and aeronautical decision making. Given this emphasis, several issues need
to be addressed regarding how training in decision making will be performed (other than
it being scenario-based):
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1. What are the specific critical thinking skills which are not currently taught that
support good decision making?
2. What types of training experiences facilitate development of critical thinking
skills?
3. How can critical thinking skills be evaluated?
The literature on FITS provides no answers to these questions but suggestions may be
found in the literature related to expert performance and training of critical thinking
skills. Some of this literature is discussed below.
4.2 Expert Performance
We often solicit the opinions of “experts” when confronted with difficult problems or
when seeking confirmation of decisions. We believe experts possess skills that allow
them to identify correct, more efficient, or alternative solutions quickly and reliably.
Studies of experts in other domains, including chess and medicine, have identified a
number of skills that distinguish experts from novices. For instance, expert chess players
were able to consider more options and their potential outcomes (Charness, 1981) than
novices. Experts remembered the positions of chess pieces even after a brief exposure
(Chase & Ericsson, 1982; de Groot, 1978). Randomly positioning the pieces nullified the
experts advantage.
The experts’ memory advantage appears to be related to their more efficient encoding of
information in long-term memory (LTM) that circumvents capacity constraints at earlier
stages (i.e., short-term memory, STM) of information processing (Chase & Ericsson,
1982). Avoiding STM capacity limitations enables experts to resume a task after
interruptions from unrelated activity that would otherwise interfere with the maintenance
of information in STM (Charness, 1991). This may be the basis of expert pilots’ ability
to handle multiple task demands effectively. Ericsson and Charness (1994) provide
evidence that experts store and index information in LTM in a qualitatively different
manner than novices’ allowing experts to readily recognize patterns by comparing the
present circumstances to exemplars in memory. This skill could be vital when timeconsuming deliberation of options (i.e., application of critical thinking strategies) is
impossible and makes performance less susceptible to disruption by stress or other tasks.
Experienced pilots exhibit similar memory skills that allow them to store flight related
information without decay (Endsley, 1995). Interestingly, the improved memory skills of
experts appear to be domain specific and they do not generalize to other tasks (Ericsson
& Charness, 1994).
Experts’ ability to select only task-relevant information facilitates their management of
multiple demands. They are more selective about the details they commit to memory.
Medical experts out perform medical students in identifying and recalling important
pieces of presented information (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1982; Chase & Ericsson, 1982),
whereas medical students could recall more information in general. Studies of pilots
corroborate these findings. Beck (Wiggins & O'Hare, 2003) and Rockwell and McCoy
(1988) found that experienced pilots were more efficient in acquiring and evaluating
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details of weather-related information. These and other studies suggest that novices lack
an understanding of the utility of different cues (Schvaneveldt, Beringer, Lamonica,
Tucker, & Nance, 2000; Wiggins & O'Hare, 2003).
Finally, experts employ different metacognitive skills in monitoring their own thinking
process. They check progress made toward a goal, evaluate accuracy, make decisions
about the use of time and mental effort, and search prior experience to find instances of
situations similar to the current one (Cohen et al., 2000; Freeman & Cohen, 1994;
Halpern, 1998). Experts are able to refine their understanding and knowledge by active
learning strategies. Individuals become better thinkers and learners by developing the
habit of monitoring their understanding and judging the quality of their learning.
4.3 Critical Thinking Skills Training
In light of what we know about the critical thinking skills of experts, the question arises
whether novices can be taught to behave like experts? If so, can it be shown that the skills
transfer to real world conditions? A number of studies report successful transfer of
critical thinking skills to novices (see Halpern, 1996) and there is evidence that pilots
who received decision-making training demonstrate better judgment (Buch & Diehl,
1984). Recently, the U.S. Army funded research to develop a critical thinking skills
training program for battle field decision-making (Cohen et al., 2000). A theory of the
cognitive skills necessary to make decisions on the battlefield was developed, as were
training materials and methods for delivering the training on a CD or via the World Wide
Web. The training was later utilized and found to be effective by the U.S. Army. Cohen
et al. (2000) identified several essential features of critical thinking training, including: 1)
explicit instruction and practice, 2) prior instruction on concepts and processing strategies
to facilitate learning, 3) realistic, non-routine situations that are more challenging than an
individual would likely face and 4) feedback focused on appropriate processes rather than
correct responses. The components of critical thinking skills training proposed by Cohen
et al (2000) are similar to those outlined by Halpern (1998). One important goal of this
training is to facilitate development of the ability to rapidly recognize and respond to
emergencies. Klein (1998) has stressed that this ability—the ability to rapidly recognize
cues and identify the current situation as an example of a prototype—is what
distinguishes experts from non-experts.
The training approach described above can be contrasted with a normative approach (Von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953), which describes how an individual “should” choose
between two alternatives under ideal conditions given the utility, or worth of a specific
outcome to the decision maker. Training content includes logic and decision theory,
calculations of probabilities of different alternatives and their utility when outcomes are
uncertain. Training in normative decision-making may not be particularly useful in
emergency conditions where responses must be immediate, alternatives and their
probabilities are unknown and the operators’ capacity to entertain different options is
compromised by stress, the capacity of STM, and the demands of other tasks. However,
tools are needed to aid pilots in making decisions that are not under time constraints or
high levels of stress, such as risk assessment. The Personal Minimums Checklist is an
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example of one such tool. It applies a normative approach in a tool designed to evaluate a
variety of risk factors in preflight checklist. The development, use (by ab initio and
experienced pilots) and effectiveness of such tools need further study.
It is important to acknowledge potential limitations of relying on expert reasoning
processes as a basis for modeling the behavior of novices. Experts are not infallible and
often fall short of optimal performance (Shanteau, 1992). Individuals may rely on
intuition and gut feelings to make important decisions, or they may resort to heuristics to
reduce the mental workload associated with complex reasoning tasks (Dhami, 2003;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Consequently, it is important that the utility of the
cues and strategies reported by experts be independently confirmed. In many situations,
these heuristics will result in correct decisions, especially when the decision maker is
knowledgeable about the domain. However, heuristics often fail when applied to new
problems or domains.
Finally, relying on experts requires that one identify and capture the performance of
experts by selecting a criterion for distinguishing between novice and experts that is not
arbitrary and that captures the essential features of expert performance in the area of
interest (i.e., weather decision-making) (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). In aviation, novice
and expert pilots are typically distinguished on the basis of flight hours or type ratings.
These criteria are essentially arbitrary and do not account for the varied types of
experiences that are presumably the basis of expertise.
4.4 Research Questions Concerning Pilot Instruction and Training on Decision Making
Although studies have demonstrated that novices can acquire some of the sophisticated
cognitive abilities and skills of experts, to date no one has developed training strategies
that support the rapid development of these abilities (Ericsson & Charness, 1994).
Typically, extended practice (>50 hours) is necessary to approach performance levels
comparable to that of experts in restricted domains. Achieving the level of competency
of experts may take years of experience. In light of this, what should be the goal of
decision-making training for a pilot completing ab initio training? Bell and Mauro
(1999) propose a training strategy that “accelerates the transition from novice to expert
with modeling and efficient learning experiences and direct teaching of support structures
(e.g., critical thinking skills) while teaching rules to keep the novice safe.” Modeling in
this context refers to learning decision making by observing the behavior of more
experienced pilots or through demonstration.
Any proposed method of decision-making training should satisfy several criteria in order
to have a chance of being adopted by the flight instructor community:
1) Instruction should not increase the length of pilot training and thereby the cost
to the student.
2) Teaching the relevant subject matter should not require additional skills of
Part 61 and 141 flight instructors.
3) Proficiency in decision-making should be measurable.
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4) The cost of training materials to the instructor and student should be minimal.
5) Transferability of skills to real world should be demonstrable.
5. STANDARD VERSUS COMBINED PRIVATE AND INSTRUMENT RATING
A combined curriculum was originally developed under the Advanced General Aviation
Transport Experiments program (AGATE, 2001) with the stated goal of reducing training
time and cost by 25%. An evaluation of this combined curriculum was attempted but it
was largely unsuccessful due to a number of unforeseen problems out of the
experimenters’ control. Consequently, only 8 of the 81 students who originally agreed to
participate in the evaluation completed the flight training program. Summary data from
the report showed that the students in the combined curriculum required 45% fewer trials
to meet Practical Test Standards (PTS) for maneuvers tested in the study but required 20
more hours than those in the standard flight training group to pass the final check ride.
No meaningful conclusions can be drawn from this data given that six students completed
the standard flight training program and only two completed the combined training
program. Nevertheless, the AGATE report (AGATE, 1999) concludes that the combined
training program “represents a very significant reduction in the amount of training
required” (italicized in the original document).
Interest in combining initial pilot training and instrument flight training is not new. A
number of earlier studies (Creelman, 1955a, 1955b, 1955c, 1956; University of Illinois
Institute of Aviation, 1956); (Jolley, 1958) conducted by military and civilian
organizations have evaluated integrated training programs. Perhaps most pertinent is a
report by the University of Illinois Institute of Aviation where they sought to train private
pilots within an allotted 40 hours who could pass the private pilots license exam and
demonstrate an “appreciable” ability to fly on instruments. All 18 students involved in
the study successfully completed the program.
Recently, Middle Tennessee State University received federal funding under the SATS
program to construct and evaluate a flight training resulting in combined private and
instrument rating for TAA’s (P. Craig, personal communication, November 30, 2004).
The program employs a detailed FITS inspired curriculum. The purpose of the research
is to determine whether training using advanced avionics and an integrated curriculum is
superior to a traditional training program using aircraft equipped with standard avionics
(i.e., steam gauge). Proficiency will be evaluated in terms of performance on the PTS
and compared to historical data. Although, the research may identify differences between
the two curriculums it does not allow any conclusions to be drawn regarding whether the
differences are attributable to the syllabus, the avionics technology, or the instructors due
to the experimental design.
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6. USE OF PERSONAL COMPUTER-BASED AVIATION TRAINING DEVICES
(PCATD)
PCATDs may provide an alternative means of reducing pilot training costs and of
training higher-order pilot skills. The findings of FAA-funded research (Taylor et al.,
2003) indicate that practice on a PCATD is at least as effective as practice in an airplane
or in a Flight Training Device (FTD) in meeting FAA recency of experience
requirements for instrument flight. PCATDs are a combination of software and hardware
packages for a standard home personal computer that emulate an airplane cockpit and
controls (FAA, 2002b). FTDs emulate a specific cockpit environment and typically have
a higher level of fidelity than PCATDs. However, FTDs are more expensive, costing as
much as $30,000, while a PCATD costs $5,000 or less. In addition to being more
affordable to flight schools and individual instructors, PCATDs are also less costly to
maintain.
Current FAA regulations (advisory circular 61-126) specify certification requirements for
PCATDs along with the standards for which a PCATD can be used in lieu of actual
flight. For Part 61 schools, 20 hours of FTD or flight simulator time can be used in place
of actual flight time. Of those 20 hours, 10 can be accrued on PCATDs. For Part 141
schools, up to 15 hours of can be simulated. Of those 15 hours, 10 can be accrued on
PCATDs. The PCATDs appear to hold promise as a tool for improving training
effectiveness and efficiency while controlling time and costs.
Research has shown that PCATDs are effective training tools for a number of skills
including teaching new pilots instrument tasks (Taylor et al., 1999) and some aircraft
maneuvers (Ortiz, 1994). There is evidence that training costs may be reduced even after
the time on PCTAD is taken into account (Ortiz, 1994; Taylor et al., 1999). Ortiz (1994)
trained college students with no previous flying skills to perform a simple maneuver,
either in a PCATD or in an airplane. The PCATD did not decrease the total time of
training; however a cost benefit analysis showed that using a PCATD would save the
pilot money by eliminating actual flight time. Taylor and colleagues (1999) investigated
transfer of training and found that most of the benefits of training on a PCTAD are
obtained in the early stages, with little transfer of training benefit when reviewing already
learned tasks, unless some time has passed since the task was last performed. PCATDs
have also been shown to be useful in maintaining instrument proficiency (Talleur et al.,
2001). The PCTAD may be effective in maintaining proficiency in skills that are more
discrete (i.e., procedural), and which degrade more over time if unpracticed
(Mengelkoch, Adams, & Gainer, 1958). This could be important in modern avionics
suites that require the user to navigate menu structures and program the navigation
computer. (FAA, 2003c) found that 50% of the pilots in their study required assistance in
programming a GPS system. Although the pilots in their study had varying degrees of
familiarly with the system, this finding is important because pilots may forget the
complex programming procedures for their avionics if they fly infrequently.
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Interestingly, most PCATD studies (Koonce & Bramble Jr., 1998; Talleur, Taylor,
Emanuel Jr., Rantanen, & Bradshaw, 2003; Taylor et al., 1999) report that positive
transfer of training effects are obtained for instrument maneuvers that entail procedural
components (Smode, Hall, & Meyer, 1966), and less transfer for flight tasks that are more
perceptual-motor in nature. A GAO (1999) report on PCATDs cites comments by experts
(Talleur et al., 2001) that “the main value of PCATDs is in teaching procedures and
concepts, rather than the complete set of skills needed to fly.” A similar finding was
reported for PCTAD training on rotary aircraft (Johnson & Stewart, 1999). This suggests
that PCATDs are less effective in training of the “Physical Airplane” or the “stick and
rudder” aspect of flying a plane (Dennis & Harris, 1998). This is reflected in the way
PCATDs are being employed by flight training schools. A survey by (Wiggins, Hampton,
Morin, Larssen, & Tronscoso, 2002) found that PCATDs were primarily used for private
pilot and instrument training with a focus on procedural knowledge.
To date, studies of PCATDs clearly demonstrate flight training benefits, and there is
limited evidence that they will also reduce the cost of training. The PCATD can help
maintain procedural skills and may also prove effective in training higher-level skills
such as decision making. A number of recent studies suggest that PC scenario based
training can be effective in improving decision making skills of first responders (EMS)
(Lai et al., 2004), security personnel (Greitzer et al., 2004), and army infantry (Cohen et
al., 2000).
7. CURRENT STATUS OF THE FITS PROGRAM
The FITS program proposes to modernize GA pilot training by adopting a system safety
approach and emphasizing the use of technology, training in risk management, and
emphasizing SCFT. Given this review of the pertinent literature we believe that much
work needs to be done to provide the details of the specific training programs that would
justify this initiative. For instance, FITS related publications provide little guidance on
training issues related to advanced avionics or how to specifically improve higher-order
cognitive skills related to aeronautical decision making, risk management, situational
awareness, and single-pilot resource management. An assumption underlying much of
FITS is that “scenario-based training” will improve pilot decision making without
identifying the specific knowledge or cognitive skills that are to be trained. Also, the
flight instructor is provided few tools to adequately discriminate between good and bad
skill performance.
To date we have found little evidence that the published FITS training syllabi heed past
lessons learned or were influenced in any large measure by pertinent research findings
from decision-making, training, human factors and automation literature. It is hoped that
these issues will be addressed in the near future. Nevertheless, the training syllabi are
available and are being used by a number of aircraft manufacturers. Although, the FITS
approach was to be employed in all of GA flight training it is currently limited to training
pilots transitioning to TAAs.
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The extant research literature does provide guidance to the developers of the FITS
training program on many issues; however, there exist a number of significant gaps in our
knowledge related to the effectiveness of different types of training, critical thinking
skills training, training objectives for advanced avionics, effects of automation on pilot
skills, and the potential benefits of PCATDS for pilot training. To aid this endeavor we
have outlined five research requirements (listed below) pertaining to each of these areas
for future FAA research funding. A more detailed description of each research
requirement can be found in Appendix A.
Comparison of structured cross-country flight training (SCFT) and standard flight
training:
a. Does SCFT and standard flight training result in comparable levels of
proficiency?
b. What skills are best acquired via SCFT vs part task training (PTT)?
c. When in pilot training should training shift from PTT to SCFT?
d. Is a hybrid training strategy (i.e., varied-priority training) a viable
alternative to PTT and SCFT?
Development of critical thinking skills training for general aviation
a. What are the fundamental skills of effective decision making, risk
management, resource management and situational awareness?
b. What should be the goals of critical thinking skills training for
different levels of pilot skill including ab initio and instrument license?
c. How do you increase the transferability of the skills to real world
conditions where decisions are made under stress and time pressures?
d. What is the impact of advanced on avionics on pilot decision making?
Identification of learning objectives for aircraft equipped with advanced avionics
a. What are the skills and knowledge associated with using steam gauge
versus glass cockpits and how do they differ?
b. How do the task demands associated with each differ as a function of
phase of flight?
c. What core knowledge should a pilot of glass cockpit demonstrate?
Understanding the effect of automation on piloting skills
a. How does the use of automation affect a GA pilot’s manual flight
skills?
b. How is pilot competency in programming advanced avionics affected
by layoffs of different duration?
c. Does training in automation philosophy improve the use of
automation?
d. What is the potential for positive or negative transfer of learning
between advanced avionics developed by different manufacturers?
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Use of PCATDs in pilot training
a. What pilot decision making skills and knowledge can be effectively
taught using PCATDs?
b. Does a PCATD reduce of the time and cost of pilot training?
Finally, noticeably absent from the FITS program literature is a statement of a target goal
either in terms of reduced GA accidents or increased training effectiveness as measured
by time, cost or proficiency. Given the absence of any specific goals, one might argue
that there is little to justify the expenditure of time and money needed to develop the
training program. The absence of specific targets or performance goals will make
evaluation of the success or failure of the FITS program difficult to ascertain.
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9. APPENDIX A
Comparison of Traditional Flight Training Program to that of a Structured Cross-country
Flight Training Program
Sponsor: XXXX

Sponsor POC: XXXX

Requirement Statement: This study will compare the traditional flight training program
to that of a structured cross-country flight training program, as described by
FAA/Industry Training Standards (FITS).
Background: The FAA Industry Training Standards (FITS) program suggests that
traditional skill-based curriculums are no longer adequate for pilot training given the
emergence of Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA). The advent of TAA with advanced
avionics suites place new demands on pilots, which are not addressed by current training
curricula. FITS intends to implement SCFT in an effort to address these needs.
The proposal to shift pilot training to SCFT requires evidence demonstrate equal or
greater pilot proficiency. To date no such evidence exists. Recently, a hybrid training
strategy called varied-priority training has shown promise as an alternative training
paradigm. Varied-priority training embeds PTT within whole-task training. Participants
are asked to perform multiple tasks but the emphasis placed on the different task
components is varied across training sessions or blocks. The advantage of this approach
is that students learn how to coordinate and manage multiple tasks while reducing the
processing loads that interfere with the acquisition of individual task skills. Published
studies show that varied-priority training is effective in training both component and task
management skills and may be applicable to more complex aviation training
environments. Currently, there is no published research that directly compares a SCFT
program to traditional part-task or varied-priority training programs. More specifically,
given the cost-sensitive nature of general aviation pilot training, it is important to identify
the effectiveness of a SCFT program as compared to traditional flight training or a
varied-priority training program?
Output: A comparison of the effectiveness of a traditional part-task flight training
program to SCFT and the hybrid varied-priority training. Analysis should include a
comparison of average training time (including ground and flight instruction), training
costs, and pilot performance on standardized FAA exams (written, oral, and flight).
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Development of Critical Thinking Skills Training Program for General Aviation
Sponsor: XXXX

Sponsor POC: XXXX

Requirement Statement: The goal of this project is to improve GA pilot training by
identifying the critical thinking skills to support effective decision making and develop a
program to train and evaluate those skills.
Background: Accident statistics identify a weakness in pilot decision making but it is
unclear why GA pilot training programs fail in instructing these skills. To date most
safety-related initiatives have consisted of motivational and experiential based
approaches; however, training programs that identify dangerous behaviors (i.e., scud
running) and that advise individuals of against such actions are not very effective.
New avionics technologies are supposed to improve pilot situational awareness and
enable better decision making. However, the new information sources may bias decision
making in unexpected ways. For example, research has identified a tendency among
pilots to use a Graphical Weather Information System (GWISs) tactically to avoid
hazardous weather conditions even though the temporal or spatial resolution of the
weather information was insufficient for this purpose. Evidence of increased risk taking
has been reported by pilots interviewed as part of the Capstone project. Under Capstone,
200 Alaskan aircraft were equipped with a multifunction display (MFP), GPS and
datalink. Pilot self-reports revealed that 84% of the participating pilots reported that
“there would be or already is” an increased tendency to fly under lower visibility
conditions using the displays. Roughly half of the pilots agreed that there was an
increased tendency to engage in other risky behaviors including flying at lower altitudes
under low visibility conditions, fly closer to hazardous terrain features, etc. New pilot
training curriculums being developed under the FITS program will attempt to address
these issues by focusing on the training of risk management, information management,
and aeronautical decision making. At present it is unclear how training in decision
making and other critical thinking skills should be implemented. More specifically, what
judgment or metacognitive skills should be the focus of training and how can the
effectiveness of such training could be evaluated.
Output: A report that describes the rationale, development, and evaluation of a program
to train critical decision-making skills. Recommendations should include how such
training could be integrated within constraints of existing GA pilot training programs
including ab initio, instrument and recurrency training.
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Identification of Learning Objectives for Aircraft Equipped with Advanced Avionics
Sponsor: XXXX

Sponsor POC: XXXX

Requirement Statement: Identification of the unique knowledge and skills needed to
operate a GA aircraft with advanced avionics
Background: The FITS (FAA/Industry Training Standards) proposes to modernize
aviation pilot training while also improving training effectiveness and safety. The FITS
training program will first target new and experienced pilots who are transitioning to
technically advanced aircraft (TAA) and who use the aircraft for transportation rather
than recreation. TAA like the Diamond DA-40 come equipped with integrated
multifunction displays capable of displaying a variety of new information sources (GPS,
near real time weather information, terrain maps) in addition to standard aircraft
instruments. It is believed that this information will improve pilot situational awareness
and thereby reduce accident rates. These developments will require the creation of new
pilot training programs for initial, transition and recurrent training. The new training
programs developed by FITS will emphasize single-pilot resource management as the
pilot of newer aircraft must monitor, select and integrate information from multiple
displays.
A pilot of these aircraft will need to manage more information sources that can increase
work loads during critical phases of flight or during emergency situations. The
availability of more information sources will require training in the management and
prioritization during different phases of flight. Researchers have identified a number of
important issues related to pilot training and use of advanced avionics. These issues
include problems with mode awareness, poor pilot understanding of the design and
operation of the automation, new error paths, degradation of basic instrument skills and
other manual flying skills, tendency for pilots to continue to program their selves out of
trouble rather than turning off automation and taking control. There is also some
evidence that situational awareness may be diminished under some circumstances in
aircraft with advanced avionics. These findings suggest that operating an aircraft with
advanced avionics may require a different subset of skills than flying an aircraft equipped
with steam gauges.
Output: The research report identifying the relevant skills and knowledge needed to
operate a highly automated aircraft, an evaluation of the impact of advanced avionics on
situational awareness, manual and instrument flight skills, and recommendations
regarding proficiency requirements for use of advanced avionics.
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Understanding the Effect of Automation on Piloting Skills
Sponsor: XXXX

Sponsor POC: XXXX

Research Statement: This study will investigate 1) the impact of automation on pilots’
manual flight skills 2) how pilot competency in programming advanced avionics is
affected by layoffs of different durations and the potential for positive or negative
transfer of learning between advanced avionics developed by different manufacturers.
Bacground: Glass cockpits similar to those currently being introduced in GA first
became widely available in commercial aviation with the introduction of the Boeing
757/767 and Airbus A310/320. The transition to glass cockpits can be challenging as
pilots have reported that the switch to a highly automated aircraft is more difficult than
the transition between aircraft with conventional avionics Although the level of
automation in commercial aviation and GA differ in terms of degree and sophistication
many of the problems associated with automation identified in FAA technical reports and
in academic and government technical literature are pertinent to GA. These problems
include degradation of basic instrument or other manual flight skills, potential for
negative transfer of learning between different avionics suites produced by different
manufactures, and declines in pilot programming of avionics following periods of low
flying activity. Understanding the impact of automation information is important for
providing guidance to the FAA and pilots regarding potential problems in use of
automation.
Output: A report that describes 1) the impact of automation on pilot manual flight and
instrument skills, 2) the effects of periods of low flying activity on pilot recall of
programming procedures and use of automation, and 3) negative or positive transfer of
learning resulting from the use advanced avionic developed by different manufacturers.
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Development and evaluation of Personal Computer-based Aviation Training Devices
(PCATDs) for Training in Decision Making.
Sponsor: XXXX

Sponsor POC: XXXX

Requirement Statement: This study will compare the effectiveness of PCATDs in
training situational awareness, aeronautical decision making, risk management, and
single-pilot resource management.
Background: FAA funded research has shown that practice on a PCATD is at least as
effective as practice in an airplane a Flight Training Device (FTD) in meeting FAA
recency of experience requirements for instrument flight. The PCATDs also appear to
hold promise as a tool for training decision making for ab initio pilots.
Research has shown that PCATDs are effective training tools for a number of skills
including teaching new pilots’ instrument tasks and some aircraft maneuvers. There is
some evidence that training costs may be reduced even after the time on PCTAD is taken
into account. An investigation of transfer of training showed that most of the benefits of
training on a PCTAD are obtained in the early stages of training and that there is little
benefit (in terms of reduced transfer of training) when reviewing already learned tasks
unless some time has passed since the task was last performed. PCATDs have also been
shown to be a useful tool in maintaining instrument proficiency.
Output: 1) Development of a PC/Web based pilot decision making training program
and, 2) An evaluation of the effectiveness of such training.
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